A case of non-payment of rent, accommodation for in-person hearing and possible abuse of process (Gencay v. Capreit, 2021)

 

An interesting recent ruling from the Divisional Court that involves non-payment of rent, accommodation request for an in-person hearing on the grounds of disability, as well as issues with delays and potential abuse of process:

Gencay v. Capreit Limited Partnership, 2021 ONSC 8293 (CanLII), <https://canlii.ca/t/jlcv8>

"... [3] On the basis of the findings of the LTB, Mr Gencay has not paid rent since February 2021. Monthly rent is $1,570 per month. Total arrears were found by the LTB to be $10,990 to August 31, 2021. Additional arrears have accrued since that date bringing the total outstanding to $17,720. A further $1,570 will accrue on January 1, 2022.

[4] The findings as to arrears and the quantum of monthly rent are set out clearly in the LTB's decision.

[5] By direction of Favreau J. emailed December 6, 2021, Mr Gencay was directed to provide confirmation of the rent and arrears in advance of a case management teleconference scheduled for today, December 16, 2021.

[6] By email from Mr Gencay on December 7, 2021, he advised that he suffers from a hearing disability that renders him unable to participate in a hearing by electronic means. He provided some medical evidence in support of this position. That evidence does not include an opinion from a doctor that his disability renders him unable to participate in electronic communications by telephone or videoconference. However, this court will accommodate such a request to the point of undue hardship without full inquiry at the initial stages of process in this court, rather than delay proceedings to inquire into the claimed need for accommodation further. By direction from me on December 7, 2021, it was directed that the case management teleconference scheduled for December 16, 2021 be held in person. I also directed that Mr Gencay provide the particulars required by Favreau J. by December 10, 2021.

[7] By email from My Gencay on December 10, 2021, Mr Gencay stated that he had not understood that the landlord had been making claims respecting non-payment of rent, and because he was not able to hear proceedings before the LTB because of his hearing disability (one of his grounds of appeal), he did not realize he may have been asked questions at the LTB about non-payment of rent. He then wrote as follows:

Of course now - respecting request of appeal court - I will double-check what happened with withdrawals using a dedicated banking statement, but I have no access to my account on-line also I want to keep confidential all other transactions not related to this appeal case. So that I will need to request from my bank a customized account report to cover December 2020 (start date of my lease) - November 2021. Usually such customized reports are issued by bank's head offices and not by the branch. As a conclusion I may need up to 10 business days to gather such a report and submitting it to all parties of this appeal case.

[8] In response, this court directed as follows on December 13, 2021:

Mr Gencay has had the LTB's decision in writing in advance of this appeal. His request for a further ten business days to produce bank statements showing payment of rent is denied; he will be expected to provide proof of any payments inconsistent with the LTB's findings at the scheduled in-person case management teleconference on December 16, 2021, failing which the court may infer non-payment for the purpose of establishing interim terms for continuation of the stay pending appeal. Mr Gencay may wish to attend at his bank for the purpose of obtaining the necessary bank statement so that he can provide it to the court on December 16th.

[9] By email from Mr Gencay sent on the morning of the case management conference, he advised as follows:

On December 15th, 2021 I visited my bank to discover what happened in my account which was set to automatically pay my rents to the Landlord. Now - unfortunately - I understand that available funds in this account remained insufficient since January 2021. (And I have never checked it in between). Due to my current personal finance, I have no immediate funds to close the rent balance; however as of December 15th, 2021 I ordered an international money transfer from my bank in my home country. These funds will be available as of December 24, 2021. Then, I will immediately close, at once full balance with a Money Order.

Under these circumstances and facts, I preferred not to attend the hearing of December 16, 2021 at the Divisional Court.

[10] The finding of non-payment of rent is set out clearly in the LTB decision which Mr Gencay is appealing. I make no finding as to whether Mr Gencay had formal notice of it prior to the LTB hearing - that is a matter for the main appeal - but I do not accept that the issue was not discovered by him until December 10, 2021. Further, the directions of Favreau J. of December 6, 2021 and from me on December 7, 2021, clearly identify the arrears issue and set out the amounts. Finally, I do not accept that Mr Gencay had no awareness that his rent had not been paid and his bank account had insufficient funds to cover the rent for a period of eleven months. This would require Mr Gencay to misunderstand his means by a quantum of many thousands of dollars for a period of many months. There can be many reasons why a tenant may fall into rent arrears. Being oblivious to on-payment is almost never one of them, and that claim lacks credibility in the totality of the circumstances of this case. I do not accept that Mr Gencay did not know about the non-payment issue until his response to the court on December 10, 2021.

[11] The requirement to pay rent is a tenant's fundamental obligation. Mr Gencay's claim that he required a further ten "business days" to document this issue, and latterly that he has arranged to be put in funds to pay his rent, but will be unable to do so until Christmas Eve, does not respond adequately to the situation. It is consistent with an ongoing attempt to delay justice. Mr Gencay's unilateral decision not to attend the in-person case management teleconference reflects further abuse of the process of this court. Public resources were spent to accommodate Mr Gencay so that he could speak with me about this situation today. Having unilaterally cancelled the hearing, at the last minute, Mr Gencay cannot now complain that he did not have a chance to address proposed terms for his payment of outstanding arrears and ongoing rent.

[12] Notwithstanding all of this, I will give Mr Gencay a chance to pay the arrears and rent for January 2022 into court, but I will not give him until Christmas Eve to do that. I will leave time for the landlord to obtain an order lifting the stay before the holiday period begins if Mr Gencay does not make the required payment on time. For Mr Gencay's information, he can arrange to have the funds directly deposited electronically with the Accountant of the Superior Court - he may obtain information on how to do that from the Office of the Accountant. This may save him time in making the required payment.

[13] The court will give further directions respecting the underlying appeal if the funds are paid to the Accountant by December 22nd, or, if they are not, once the stay of eviction is lifted and the eviction order is enforced. Either party may request such directions by email.

[...]"

Disclaimer:

You should not act or rely on any information provided in this blog. It is not legal advice, and the content is provided for general discussion and general information purposes only and to help encourage further research. To ensure your interests are protected, retain or formally seek legal advice from a licensed legal professional.

Never disclose details about your specific legal matters outside of situations when you have established solicitor-client relationship with a qualified legal professional. By using this blog, you acknowledge and accept this warning and agree to waive all liability for use of any information contained in this blog.

Commercial lease case: CERS, ex turpi causa, RJR test, right of re-entry during eviction moratorium (8443220 Canada Inc. v. VGR Investments, 2021)

 

An interesting new ruling (in commercial tenancy setting) on the right of re-entry during the eviction moratorium and equitable relief: 8443220 Canada Inc. v. V.G.R Investments Ltd., 2021 ONSC 8258 (CanLII), <https://canlii.ca/t/jlc8n>.

The tenant received a subsidy under CERS ("Canada Emergency Rent Subsidy"), but did not pay full rent. The landlord resorted to self-help by utilizing a bailiff to re-enter the premises, despite the fact that "Sections 79 - 85 of the CTA ostensibly prohibit commercial landlords from locking out their tenants who are in receipt of CERS benefits for non-payment of rent during the pandemic moratorium".

The landlord tried ex turpi causa argument (claiming that the tenant did not come to the court with “clean hands”, a precondition for equitable relief) on the grounds that the tenant was not paying full rent despite being a recipient of CERS, but this argument failed and the court granted the tenant a mandatory interlocutory injunction.

The ruling provides a brief overview (in COVID-19 context) of an application of the three-part test for granting an interlocutory injunction, i.e. the well-known “R.J.R. MacDonald test” from RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 1994 CanLII 117 (SCC), [1994] 1 SCR 311, <https://canlii.ca/t/1frtw>, which was mentioned previously in this blog (e.g. here):

1) serious issue to be tried;

2) irreparable harm; and

3) balance of convenience.

On ex turpi causa (under the first part of the RJR test):

"[16] 844 points to the clear words of the statute and regulation to state that VGR was not entitled to re-enter its premises. It adds that VGR does not deny that the facts of this case fall under the CTA provisions set out above, other than in regard to its arguments of non-payment and that 844 is wrongly obtaining CERS funds. Those facts alone, 844 argues, raise a strong prima facie case in its favour.

[17] VGR responds that both the CTA and the regulation assume that full payment of rent is made under the CERS. Further it argues that the common law principle of ex turpi causa prevents 844 from obtaining equitable relief from this court when it is misleading the Canadian government about its use of CERS funds. It also states that rent was not paid at all in July 2021.

[18] While VGR has a point in that the forms signed by 844 imply that full rent payment will be made by commercial tenants receiving CERS funds, the terms of the CTA and O.Reg 763/20 do not explicitly set out that requirement.

[19] In Livent Inc. (Special Receiver and Manager of) v. Deloitte & Touche, 2016 ONCA 11, Blair J.A., writing for the Ontario Court of Appeal stated, the term, ex turpi causa non oritur action means "from a dishonourable cause an action does not arise". Blair J.A. referred to :

The statement of Lord Mansfield in Holman v. Johnson (1775), 98 E.R. 1120, at p. 1121, [which] has often been cited as authoritative:

No Court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or an illegal act. If, from the plaintiff's own stating or otherwise, the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa, or the transgression of a positive law of this country, there the Court says he has no right to be assisted. It is upon that ground the Court goes; not for the sake of the defendant, but because they will not lend their aid to such a plaintiff.

[20] Strictly speaking, the doctrine is a defence to a claim by a malefactor, one which seeks to prevent them from profiting from their misconduct. The doctrine is rarely used in Canada, and only in narrow circumstances. As Blair J.A. summarized after reviewing the two key Supreme Court of Canada cases on the doctrine:

The application of the ex turpi causa doctrine has therefore been strictly limited in Canada. It will apply only where allowing a plaintiff's claim would introduce inconsistency into the fabric of the law - by "giving with one hand what it takes away with the other": per McLachlin J. in Hall, 1993 CanLII 141 (SCC), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 159, at p. 178, quoted with approval by Rothstein J. in Zastowny, 2008 SCC 4 (CanLII), [2008] 1 S.C.R. 27, at para. 22.

[21] Here there is, at the very least, a real ambiguity regarding the obligations of a tenant receiving benefits under CERS, that is whether it is prohibited from receiving further benefits when it is unable to pay its full rent. I have been pointed to no authority in that regard.

[22] I also point out that it is not the Canadian Revenue Agency, which is raising this argument, it is the landlord, VGR. To the best of my knowledge, CRA still considers 844 to be eligible for the CERS programme. It has not appointed VGR to act as its agent in enforcing the programme.

[23] I add that when one looks to improper conduct, and the doctrine of ex turpi causa, that VGR’s own conduct violates the clear terms of the CTA. It knew that a moratorium on re-entry was in place, yet it chose to exercise a dubious right of re-entry. It can only be assumed that it felt that the evicted tenant, 844, would not fight back. Or as, the cliché has it, it is better to ask forgiveness than permission. If VGR felt that it had a right to re-entry based upon the arguments it raises in this motion, it could have brought an application to this court, seeking that relief. Instead it resorted to self-help. Having done so, it hardly lies in its mouth to complain about 844’s conduct regarding CERS."

On the RJR test:

1)
Strong Prima Facie Case

"[12] The test for the granting of an interlocutory injunction is the well known “R.J.R. MacDonald test”: 1) serious issue to be tried; 2) irreparable harm; and 3) balance of convenience: R.J.R Macdonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 1994 CanLII 117 (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, at para. 43. Since the moving party is seeking a mandatory injunction, the first arm of the test is a strong prima facie case rather than a serious issue: Blue Health Consultants v. Blue Health Services Inc. 2021 ONSC 2841 (“Blue Health”), at para. 39 citing R. v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., 2018 SCC 5, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 196, at para. 15.

[...]

[15] As set out above, O.Reg 763/20 under the CTA provides that the non-enforcement period under s. 79 runs from December 17, 2020 to April 22, 2022.

[16] 844 points to the clear words of the statute and regulation to state that VGR was not entitled to re-enter its premises. It adds that VGR does not deny that the facts of this case fall under the CTA provisions set out above, other than in regard to its arguments of non-payment and that 844 is wrongly obtaining CERS funds. Those facts alone, 844 argues, raise a strong prima facie case in its favour."

Read above on the ex turpi causa argument.

2)
Irreparable Harm

"[24] There is little argument against the notion that 844 would suffer irreparable harm if the requested injunction is not granted. It would be out of business. By way of example, Pattillo J. found a similar result to amount to irreparable harm in Blue Health, above.

3)
Balance of Convenience

"[25] 844 argues that the balance of convenience favours it. First, it argues that it is the victim of its landlord’s improper behaviour in locking it out of the premises. Second, it refers to its irreparable harm argument. Third, it points to the terms to which it is willing to agree, which would substantially close the gap on any unpaid rent, to the benefit of the landlord.

[26] VGR argues that it is the aggrieved party who has been losing unpaid rent each month. If 844 intended to repay outstanding rent, it would have done so already as the issue has been on the table for over a year. It should not have to forebear any more of its tenant’s conduct. It asserts as well that at one point 844 chained some furniture to the front door, violating fire safety rules. But it did not say that that was a long-standing problem.

[27] The CTA pandemic amendments cited above were put into place to protect commercial tenants from the type of unilateral conduct to which VGR resorted during the pandemic. Without being allowed back into the premises, 844 will lose its business. But it is willing to pay an amount far greater than its rent each month to help make up for rental shortfalls.

[28] VGR has offered no evidence that it had re-let the premises since it re-entered them. If 844 were to pay the rent, including payments towards arrears, that it offers, the interests of the landlord, VGR would be substantially met without having to attempt to re-let the premises."

To read the ruling in full:

8443220 Canada Inc. v. V.G.R Investments Ltd., 2021 ONSC 8258 (CanLII), <https://canlii.ca/t/jlc8n>

Disclaimer:

You should not act or rely on any information provided in this blog. It is not legal advice, and the content is provided for general discussion and general information purposes only and to help encourage further research. To ensure your interests are protected, retain or formally seek legal advice from a licensed legal professional.

Never disclose details about your specific legal matters outside of situations when you have established solicitor-client relationship with a qualified legal professional. By using this blog, you acknowledge and accept this warning and agree to waive all liability for use of any information contained in this blog.

Attempt to introduce fresh evidence to argue that consent order was induced by misrepresentation, mixed fact and law (Fernandes v. Golle, 2021)

 

A brief recent ruling from the Divisional Court on a dismissed S2 motion to set aside an ex parte eviction order, which serves as a reminder re: attempts to introduce fresh evidence:

Fernandes v. Golle, 2021 ONSC 6773 (CanLII), <https://canlii.ca/t/jldd9>

"[1]               This is an appeal brought by the Appellant Tenants under the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, S.O.2006, c.17 (the “Act”). On August 10, 2020 the Landlord and Tenant Board made an order terminating the Tenants’ tenancy. The Tenants applied to set aside that order and on August 31, 2021 the Landlord and Tenant Board made an order on consent denying the Tenants’ motion to set aside and providing that the stay of the order terminating the tenancy would be lifted on November 17, 2020. The Tenants seek to appeal both orders. Their appeal was accompanied by a motion to introduce fresh evidence. The Tenants were granted leave to appeal the consent order by Corbett J.

[2]               The basis for the Tenants’ appeal is that the consent order of August 31, 2020 should be set aside because the Landlords induced them to consent to that order by misrepresenting to them that if they consented to the order they would be able to purchase the subject property for fair market value. The fresh evidence that the Tenants sought to adduce is directed at providing an evidentiary basis for the Tenants’ argument that the consent order was induced by a misrepresentation.

[3]               Pursuant to s.210 (1) of the Act the Divisional Court’s jurisdiction to hear appeals from the Landlord and Tenant Board’s orders is limited to questions of law. This appeal raises a question of mixed fact and law. Therefore, the Divisional Court has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

[4]               The Respondent Landlords are entitled to their costs of this appeal, which we fix in the amount of $9000.00, all inclusive."

Disclaimer:

You should not act or rely on any information provided in this blog. It is not legal advice, and the content is provided for general discussion and general information purposes only and to help encourage further research. To ensure your interests are protected, retain or formally seek legal advice from a licensed legal professional.

Never disclose details about your specific legal matters outside of situations when you have established solicitor-client relationship with a qualified legal professional. By using this blog, you acknowledge and accept this warning and agree to waive all liability for use of any information contained in this blog.

A case of concurrent proceedings at the LTB and the Superior Court in condo context (Frontenac Condominium Corporation No. 6 v. McCauley, 2021)

 

A interesting new addition on CanLII that touches on situations of parallel proceedings by a condominium corporation against a tenant and a condo owner against the same tenant, seeking essentially the same relief.

"[8] While the applicant is encouraged by the reports that Ms. McCauley is once again attempting to obtain an eviction order from the Landlord and Tenant Board, it believes that pursuant to its obligations under the Condominium Act, 1998, S.O. 1998, c. 19, and in particular its duty to comply with the Act, the condominium declaration, its bylaws and rules, it has the right, and, indeed, is obliged to, pursue its own remedies to require compliance by the respondents.

[9] Section 134 of the Condominium Act authorises certain parties to seek a compliance order and for the court to grant such relief as is fair and equitable in all of the circumstances.

[10] The court has the express power to grant an order terminating a lease of a unit for residential purposes if it is satisfied that the lessee is in contravention of an order that has been made under section 134.

[...]

[17] As to the issue of concurrent proceedings before this court and the Landlord and Tenant Board seeking similar relief, as has been pointed out by counsel for the applicant, the applicant is not a party to those proceedings and, as the history of this matter has shown, has little if any ability to influence, let alone direct those proceedings or the outcome of those proceedings. It seems to me that the applicant has been more than patient with both Ms. Warwick and Ms. McCauley. While it is always a matter of concern to have what are effectively parallel proceedings before different tribunals, seeking essentially the same relief, the two sets of proceedings are brought by different parties with different interests and different responsibilities. In the case of the applicant it has, as has been pointed out, clear and unequivocal obligations under the Condominium Act, 1998 to ensure compliance with not only the Act, but the condominium declaration, the rules of the condominium and its bylaws. Under those circumstances I see no justification in further delaying the ability of the applicant to obtain relief because of the ongoing proceedings in front of the Landlord and Tenant Board.

[18] The easy answer to the concerns raised by Ms. Warwick is that she now complies with the behaviour that the relief sought by the applicant invites. If she does, then the next step concerning compliance will not have to be taken, and any other consequences that may arise from her behaviour to date will be left to be dealt with by the Landlord and Tenant Board. But if on the other hand she is non-compliant, the applicant should be at liberty to seek further relief from this court."

_____________________

Frontenac Condominium Corporation No. 6 v. McCauley, 2021 ONSC 8181 (CanLII), <https://canlii.ca/t/jlbc6>

"[1]               On today’s motion the applicant condominium corporation seeks orders relating to the conduct of the respondent Sara Warwick, and her continued occupancy as a tenant of the unit owned by the respondent Marilyn McCauley.

[2]               The substantial record filed by the applicants contains an extensive list of incidents and complaints about Ms. Warwick. Over 200 complaints have been logged and her alleged conduct has resulted in over 60 police visits. 

[3]               Since 2018, Frontenac Condominium Corporation No. 6’s lawyers and its condominium manager have contacted Ms. McCauley at least twenty-seven (27) times by way of telephone or written communication to either advise of Ms. Warwick’s non-compliant behaviour and/or to discuss how to resolve matters.

[4]               The applicant claims to have unsuccessfully sought effective action by Ms. McCauley to address concerns about her tenant’s behaviour. Although perhaps as many as ten eviction applications under the Residential Tenancies Act have been brought, none of them have concluded with a decision.  As recently as 11 May 2021, Ms. McCauley withdrew applications for orders to terminate the tenancy and evict Ms. Warwick for wilfully or negligently causing undue damage to the premises, substantially interfering with the reasonable enjoyment or lawful right, privilege or interest of Ms. McCauley or another tenant, and seriously impairing the safety of any person.

[5]               The nature of the complaints made against Ms. Warwick include her screaming and yelling obscenities, banging on doors, punching walls, threatening physical harm, and exposing herself. While the applicant’s factum “recognizes that Sara suffers from schizo-affective disorder”, there is no medical evidence to confirm that.

[6]               An application by the condominium corporation, within which the present motion is brought, seeks relief against both Ms. McCauley and Ms. Warwick requiring the complained of behaviour to cease and, should the behaviour continue, the eviction of Ms. Warwick.

[7]               Counsel for Ms. McCauley confirmed that there are two pending proceedings before the Landlord and Tenant Board arising from unpaid rent and Ms. Warwick’s alleged behaviour. A hearing in respect of the “rent” application is scheduled for 15 February 2022. There is not yet a hearing date for the “behaviour” application.

[8]               While the applicant is encouraged by the reports that Ms. McCauley is once again attempting to obtain an eviction order from the Landlord and Tenant Board, it believes that pursuant to its obligations under the Condominium Act, 1998, S.O. 1998, c. 19, and in particular its duty to comply with the Act, the condominium declaration, its bylaws and rules, it has the right, and, indeed, is obliged to, pursue its own remedies to require compliance by the respondents.

[9]               Section 134 of the Condominium Act authorises certain parties to seek a compliance order and for the court to grant such relief as is fair and equitable in all of the circumstances.

[10]           The court has the express power to grant an order terminating a lease of a unit for residential purposes if it is satisfied that the lessee is in contravention of an order that has been made under section 134.

[11]           This motion is the first step towards obtaining an order terminating the lease between Ms. McCauley and Ms. Warwick in the event that Ms. Warwick continues to engage in the sort of conduct that has led to the many complaints that have been made concerning her. Specifically, the applicant seeks:

An order requiring the respondent, Sara Warwick, to cease and desist from engaging in dangerous, threatening, harassing and/or other non-compliant behaviour while on the applicant’s property that contravenes section 117 of the Condominium Act 1998, SO 1998, c 19 [“Condominium Act”] and/or the applicant’s governing documents, which behaviour includes but is not limited to the following:

                                i.            Engaging in conduct that necessitates police intervention;

                              ii.            Engaging in conduct that interferes with the safety and security of the applicant’s residents and guests;

                           iii.            Engaging in conduct that results in excessive noise and/or disturbance to other residents and guests; and

                           iv.            Engaging in conduct that is likely cause damage to the condominium property.

[12]           In the event that Ms. Warwick does not comply with this order, the applicant asks to be at liberty to bring a further motion for an order pursuant to section 134(4) of the Condominium Act, 1998 evicting Sara Warwick from residing in Marilyn McCauley’s unit and terminating her lease.

[13]           Ms. Warwick opposes the motion. She seeks a stay of this proceeding until the Landlord and Tenant Board has heard Ms. McCauley’s eviction applications. She also argues that many of the issues raised by the applicant have already been determined as a result of the order made by the Landlord and Tenant Board on 11 May 2021, and reported at 2020 CanLII 119104 (ON LTB), consenting to the withdrawal of the previous applications made by Ms. McCauley.

[14]           Ms. McCauley does not oppose the relief sought in this motion.

[15]           I am satisfied that the applicant’s concerns and complaints are valid. On multiple occasions Ms. Warwick has acted in an antisocial and disruptive manner that has substantially interfered with the reasonable enjoyment of other unit holders and the occupants of those units. At times her conduct has given rise to valid concerns about the safety and well-being of other occupants, their visitors, the applicant’s staff and agents. Such conduct violates the requirements of the Condominium Act as well as the applicant’s rules and bylaws.

[16]           The circumstances of this case are not dissimilar to those considered by this court in Toronto Standard Condominium Corporation No. 2395 v. Wong, 2016 ONSC 8000. In that case the court granted injunctive and declaratory relief as part of a compliance order under s. 134(1) of the Condominium Act, 1998.  As Akbarali J. noted, at para. 36, “people who move into a condominium must be prepared to live by the rules of the community that they are joining. The Act, the declaration, by-laws and rules are vital to the integrity of the title acquired by the unit owners…”

[17]           As to the issue of concurrent proceedings before this court and the Landlord and Tenant Board seeking similar relief, as has been pointed out by counsel for the applicant, the applicant is not a party to those proceedings and, as the history of this matter has shown, has little if any ability to influence, let alone direct those proceedings or the outcome of those proceedings. It seems to me that the applicant has been more than patient with both Ms. Warwick and Ms. McCauley.  While it is always a matter of concern to have what are effectively parallel proceedings before different tribunals, seeking essentially the same relief, the two sets of proceedings are brought by different parties with different interests and different responsibilities.  In the case of the applicant it has, as has been pointed out, clear and unequivocal obligations under the Condominium Act, 1998 to ensure compliance with not only the Act, but the condominium declaration, the rules of the condominium and its bylaws.  Under those circumstances I see no justification in further delaying the ability of the applicant to obtain relief because of the ongoing proceedings in front of the Landlord and Tenant Board. 

[18]           The easy answer to the concerns raised by Ms. Warwick is that she now complies with the behaviour that the relief sought by the applicant invites.  If she does, then the next step concerning compliance will not have to be taken, and any other consequences that may arise from her behaviour to date will be left to be dealt with by the Landlord and Tenant Board.  But if on the other hand she is non-compliant, the applicant should be at liberty to seek further relief from this court.

[19]           The balance of the application is adjourned to a date to be fixed by the trial co-ordinator.

[20]           An order will therefore go in accordance with these reasons. Ms. Warwick’s approval as to the form and content of my order arising out of this motion is not required."

Disclaimer:

You should not act or rely on any information provided in this blog. It is not legal advice, and the content is provided for general discussion and general information purposes only and to help encourage further research. To ensure your interests are protected, retain or formally seek legal advice from a licensed legal professional.

Never disclose details about your specific legal matters outside of situations when you have established solicitor-client relationship with a qualified legal professional. By using this blog, you acknowledge and accept this warning and agree to waive all liability for use of any information contained in this blog.