Snow removal requirement leading to constructive discrimination

 

Here is a recent ruling from the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario which showed that a lease clause putting responsibility for snow removal on the tenant led to constructive discrimination on the grounds of disability.
Although the landlord explained that he implemented the snow removal requirement because he was elderly (84 years old at the time of the events) and unable to shovel snow at the building, there was no evidence that requiring tenants to be responsible for snow removal was necessary, since the landlord could hire a third party to do snow removal.
The landlord was ordered to pay compensation for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect to the applicant / tenant and to remove the lease clause from future tenancy agreements.

Scocchia v. Sokol, 2022 HRTO 1418 (CanLII), <https://canlii.ca/t/jt96w>

More information on snow removal: 

Is snow shovelling / lawn mowing always the landlord's duty?

______________

Excerpt from Scocchia v. Sokol, 2022 HRTO 1418 (CanLII), <https://canlii.ca/t/jt96w>:

"[...]

Application to the Facts of this Case

[49]      In this Application, it was the evidence of all parties that the applicant and the respondent did not sign the Lease. Even if the Lease had been signed, it is not clear that the snow removal provisions in the Lease constitute a requirement or qualification within the meaning of section 11 of the Code. The snow removal provisions in the Lease are vague and do not create a severable obligation or enforceable contractual obligation on a tenant. They do not specifically and clearly set out the work to be performed by, or the consideration to be paid to, a tenant for snow removal. As such, the snow removal provisions in the Lease are void and unenforceable and the obligation for snow removal remained with Mr. Sokol as the landlord for the Apartment (See, Montgomery at paras. 9-16 and s. 4 RTA).

[50]      In such circumstances, it is not clear that the snow removal provisions in the Lease were a requirement or qualification within the meaning of section 11 of the Code. There was no legal obligation on Mr. Scocchia to be responsible for snow removal at the Apartment.

(b) did the respondent require tenants to be responsible for snow removal resulting in an infringement of section 11 of the Code?

[51]      While it is clear that the snow removal provisions in the Lease are unenforceable and therefore did not create a legal obligation on the applicant to assume responsibility for snow removal at the Apartment, the evidence given by Mr. Scocchia at the Merits Hearing was that when he reviewed the Lease, he understood that he would have to be responsible for snow removal if he rented the Apartment. Indeed, the Lease presented to Mr. Scocchia by the respondent states that the tenant would be responsible for snow removal, and it is undisputed that as part of the discussions about renting the Unit, Mr. Sokol and Mrs. Sokol told the applicant that as their tenant, he would have to be responsible for snow removal. Based on the evidence at the Merits Hearing, it is clear that the respondent had a rule or requirement that the tenant that rented the Apartment would be responsible for snow removal (the “snow removal requirement”). It is also clear that this requirement infringes section 11 of the Code.

(b) Did the respondent’s snow removal requirement exclude or prefer individuals with Code-protected characteristics?

[52]      I am satisfied that the snow removal requirement excludes or prefers individuals based on Code-protected characteristics. The hallmark of adverse effect discrimination is that a seemingly neutral rule or requirement is adopted which has a discriminatory effect or impact on an individual or group because it imposes obligations, penalties or restrictive conditions not imposed on others. The thrust of human rights legislation is to eliminate assumptions and break down the barriers that stand in the way of equality for all (See, Grismer at para 2). The harm experienced by a claimant must be viewed in light of the systemic or historic disadvantage experienced by persons with disabilities. It is well established that persons with disabilities experience both systemic and historic discrimination which is often manifested through social exclusion or barriers to full participation. The applicant has, in my view, made out a prima facie case of discrimination as a result of the snow removal requirement.

[53]      Although the snow removal requirement applied to all tenants, it created an additional burden on, and barrier for persons with disabilities, like Mr. Scocchia, who could not shovel snow. While it is true that the snow removal requirement only required tenants to be responsible for snow removal and did not place any obligation to personally remove snow from the premises, this does not address the additional personal and potential financial burden that this requirement placed on prospective tenants on Code-protected grounds. Although Mr. Sokol indicated that he may have been willing to allow an abatement of rent were a third party needed to clear snow for the applicant, this placed an onus on the applicant to seek out a method which could address this requirement which would not be placed on other prospective tenants who do not have a disability. As well, the respondent did not confirm that he would provide an abatement of rent but simply indicated that he may have been willing to do so.

[54]      The concept of constructive discrimination recognizes that a requirement imposed identically on everyone can have the effect of denying the right to equal treatment of people with personal characteristics protected by the Code. The snow removal requirement imposed an additional burden on a prospective tenant with a disability by requiring the prospective tenant to make inquiries of the respondent about how this requirement could be met in order to allow them to rent the Apartment, or by imposing other burdens and possible financial obligations on persons with disabilities who rented the Apartment by having to make arrangements to meet this requirement.

[55]      It is also clear from the evidence given by all of the witnesses at the Merits Hearing that this requirement did, in fact, have an adverse and discriminatory effect on Mr. Scocchia as a person with a disability. Mr. Scocchia testified that after being told that snow removal would be the responsibility of the tenant, he decided that he did not want to rent the Apartment. It is also clear from his testimony at the Merits Hearing that he did not want to rent the Apartment as a result of his disability and the additional burden the snow removal requirement would place on him. It is clear from the applicant’s testimony at the Merits Hearing that the snow removal requirement, in fact, resulted in the exclusion of Mr. Scocchia from this rental opportunity as it was central to his decision to not apply to rent the Apartment.

[56]      In addition to prohibiting a neutral requirement, qualification or factor that results in the exclusion, restriction or preference of a group of persons identified by a Code-protected ground, section 11 of the Code also provides certain defences to a respondent. Where a requirement, qualification or factor is reasonable or bona fides in the circumstances or where an applicant cannot be accommodated without undue hardship, a respondent has a valid defence to an allegation of constructive or adverse effect discrimination (See, Meiorin and Grismer).

(c) Are there reasonable or bona fide grounds for the respondent’s snow removal requirement and has the respondent accommodated the applicant to the point of undue hardship?

[57]      In Meiorin, the Supreme Court set out a three-part test to determine whether a requirement or rule that is found to be prima facie discriminatory can be justified by a respondent. Once an applicant establishes that a rule or requirement or rule is prima facie discriminatory, the onus shifts to the respondent to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the discriminatory requirement, rule or standard has a bona fide and reasonable justification. In order to establish this justification, a respondent must establish, on a balance of probabilities, that:

a.   it adopted the requirement, rule or standard for a purpose rationally connected to the function being performed;

b.   it adopted the requirement, rule or standard in an honest and good faith belief that it was necessary to the fulfillment of that purpose; and

c.   the requirement, rule or standard is reasonably necessary to accomplish its purpose or goal in the sense that the respondent cannot accommodate individuals sharing the characteristics of the applicant without experiencing undue hardship (See, Grismer at para 20).

[58]      I am satisfied that the respondent has not provided a bona fide and reasonable justification for the snow removal requirement and has failed to accommodate Mr. Scocchia to the point of undue hardship.

i. Is the snow removal requirement rationally connected to its purpose?

[59]      The purpose of the snow removal requirement is to ensure that the Building and its premises are cleared of snow and safe for tenants and members of the public in accordance with the RTA. This is required for Mr. Sokol to comply with his obligations as a landlord under the RTA and it is also required for the safety and security of tenants and members of the public at the premises. However, the snow removal requirement is not rationally connected to this purpose. The respondent has provided no rational basis for placing the obligation for snow removal on tenants. While Mr. Sokol has indicated that he cannot shovel snow because he is elderly and suffers from a medical condition, this does not provide a rational explanation for placing the obligation on tenants. No evidence was led, nor was it suggested that there was any impediment to the respondent hiring a contractor for snow removal. Nor was there any evidence of efforts made by the respondent to pursue other means of arranging for snow removal. The snow removal requirement is therefore not rationally connected to its purpose.

ii. Was the snow removal requirement adopted in an honest and good faith belief that it was necessary to the fulfillment of its purpose?

[60]      The respondent also has not demonstrated that the snow removal requirement was adopted in an honest and good faith belief that it was necessary to accomplish its purpose. As previously noted, no evidence was led to suggest that the snow removal requirement was implemented as part of a good faith belief that it was necessary to achieve its purpose of removing snow from in and around the Building. Accordingly, this requirement has not been met.

iii. Is the snow removal requirement reasonably necessary to accomplish its purpose or in the sense that the respondent cannot accommodate individuals sharing the characteristics of the applicant without experiencing undue hardship?

[61]      The respondent also has not demonstrated that the snow removal requirement was reasonably necessary to accomplish its purpose. As previously noted, there has been no explanation for placing the snow removal requirement on tenants. Although the Sokols have explained that they implemented the snow removal requirement because Mr. Sokol is elderly and unable to shovel snow at the Building, there was no evidence that requiring tenants to be responsible for snow removal was necessary for the purpose of maintaining the safety of the Building and its surrounding premises.

[62]      While the RTA prescribes that landlords are responsible for snow removal, it does not prevent a landlord from hiring a third party contractor to perform such maintenance functions. At the Merits Hearing, Mr. Sokol indicated that he would have been prepared to allow the applicant to hire a third party to remove the snow. Based on the evidence before me, the respondent was not prevented from hiring a third-party contractor to fulfill these maintenance services and no evidence was led which demonstrates that this obligation had to be placed on tenants at the Building.

[63]      Where an allegation of adverse effect discrimination is made, a respondent may also rely upon the further defence of “incapability” set out in section 17 of the Code (See Entrop at para. 77). In Entrop, the Court of Appeal for Ontario held that the three-step test set out in Meiorin should also be used to determine whether a respondent may successfully assert the defence set out in section 17 of the Code (See Entrop at para. 77). In light of my findings above, the respondent cannot rely on section 17 of the Code.

[64]      The respondent also has not demonstrated that the applicant could not be accommodated without undue hardship in accommodating the applicant. The respondent has the onus of establishing a defence of undue hardship but led no evidence on whether it would have experienced undue hardship in accommodating the applicant’s needs.

[65]      I find that the respondent’s snow removal requirement infringes section 11 of the Code by placing responsibility for snow removal on tenants and thereby adversely affecting individuals sharing the characteristics of the applicant as a person with a disability. I also find that the respondent has not provided a bona fide justification for this requirement and has not demonstrated that the applicant could not be accommodated without undue hardship.

[...]"

 

 

 

N12 and Conversion to Condominium (RTA Section 51)

 

RTA section 51 specifies when an N12 cannot be used in situations of conversion to condominium.
The simplified flow chart and the LTB rulings below can help with examples.
  1. 2. Flow chart
  2. 3. Examples of LTB rulings

I. RTA SECTION 51:

"Conversion to condominium, security of tenure
51 (1) If a part or all of a residential complex becomes subject to a registered declaration and description under the Condominium Act, 1998 or a predecessor of that Act on or after June 17, 1998, a landlord may not give a notice under section 48 or 49 to a person who was a tenant of a rental unit when it became subject to the registered declaration and description.  2006, c. 17, s. 51 (1).

PROPOSED UNITS, SECURITY OF TENURE

(2) If a landlord has entered into an agreement of purchase and sale of a rental unit that is a proposed unit under the Condominium Act, 1998 or a predecessor of that Act, a landlord may not give a notice under section 48 or 49 to the tenant of the rental unit who was the tenant on the date the agreement of purchase and sale was entered into.  2006, c. 17, s. 51 (2).

NON-APPLICATION

(3) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply with respect to a residential complex if no rental unit in the complex was rented before July 10, 1986 and all or part of the complex becomes subject to a registered declaration and description under the Condominium Act, 1998 or a predecessor of that Act before the day that is two years after the day on which the first rental unit in the complex was first rented.  2006, c. 17, s. 51 (3).

ASSIGNEE OF TENANT NOT INCLUDED

(4) Despite subsection 95 (8), a reference to a tenant in subsection (1), (2) or (5) does not include a person to whom the tenant subsequently assigns the rental unit.  2006, c. 17, s. 51 (4).

CONVERSION TO CONDOMINIUM, RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL

(5) If a landlord receives an acceptable offer to purchase a condominium unit converted from rented residential premises and still occupied by a tenant who was a tenant on the date of the registration referred to in subsection (1) or an acceptable offer to purchase a rental unit intended to be converted to a condominium unit, the tenant has a right of first refusal to purchase the unit at the price and subject to the terms and conditions in the offer.  2006, c. 17, s. 51 (5).

SAME

(6) The landlord shall give the tenant at least 72 hours notice of the offer to purchase the unit before accepting the offer.  2006, c. 17, s. 51 (6).

EXCEPTION

(7) Subsection (5) does not apply when,
(a) the offer to purchase is an offer to purchase more than one unit; or
(b) the unit has been previously purchased since that registration, but not together with any other units.  2006, c. 17, s. 51 (7)."

II. FLOW CHART (N12 in conversion to condo context):




III. LTB EXAMPLES:


1) SWL-01548-17 (Re), 2017 CanLII 48417 (ON LTB), <https://canlii.ca/t/h5332>

"[...]
Evidence:
3. The Tenant testified that she use to walk by the building when she was a child going to school and that it was a residential rental complex back then. That was over 40 years ago.  She said that she moved into the rental unit prior to the property being converted to condominiums in 2001 and was told by the previous Landlord that she had right of tenure under section 51.  The unit was sold to the current Landlord in 2014 and when she received the N12 Notice she told the Landlord that she thought section 51 applied to her.
4. The Landlord testified that she offered the Tenant the first right of refusal, but the Tenant didn’t want to purchase the unit.  The Landlord did not dispute that the property had been used as residential rentals since the Tenant was a child.
Analysis:
5. The Tenant is a person who was a tenant of a rental unit when it became subject to the registered declaration and description.  The Tenant had moved into the rental unit prior to the conversion of the rental unit into a condominium unit in 2001. Thus the tenancy falls within the scope of section 51(1) of the Act. Therefore the Landlord cannot serve the Tenant with a notice of termination under sections 48 or 49 of the Act for the Landlord’s own use or Purchaser’s own use.
6. However the exemption to section 51(1)of the Act must also be considered. That section provides that if no rental unit was rented before July 10, 1986 then section 51(1) does not apply.  In this case the rental unit was rented prior to July 10, 1986 because the Tenant testified that the property was a rental housing complex when she was a child going to school 40 years ago.   Without any evidence to the contrary I find that section 51(1) applies and the Landlord is not entitled to seve the Tenant with a N12 Notice to terminate the tenancy for purchaser’s own use and the application must be dismissed.
It is ordered that:
1. The Landlord’s application is dismissed.
[...]"


2) CEL-76563-18 (Re), 2018 CanLII 88413 (ON LTB), <https://canlii.ca/t/hv7fx>

"[...]
2. It was uncontested that the Tenants’ tenancy commenced on September 1, 2003.  According to the Tenants, the rental unit was converted to a condominium in July 2004.  It was uncontested that a conversion to condominiums took place at this residential complex. Therefore, the Tenants submit that the Landlord was not entitled to serve a notice under section 48 of the Act.
3. The Landlord is the recent purchaser of the rental unit.  She purchased the unit with the intention at some point for her son to move into the unit. The Landlord submitted that she was not aware that the Tenants she inherited with this unit were subject to subsection 51(1) of the Act. She was simply told they were month-to-month Tenants.
4. The Tenants submitted that they were aware that the unit was for sale and posted notice in the unit regarding their tenancy and subsection 51(1) of the Act.  There was no dispute that the Landlord never viewed the unit.

5. Given that there was no dispute the Tenants were occupying the rental unit when the conversation to a condominium took place back in 2004, I am satisfied that in accordance with subsection 51(1) of the Act, the Landlord was not entitled to serve a notice of termination pursuant to section 48 of the Act.   Consequently, the application is dismissed.
[...]"










Disclaimer:

You should not act or rely on any information provided in this blog. It is not legal advice, and the content is provided for general discussion and general information purposes only and to help encourage further research. To ensure your interests are protected, retain or formally seek legal advice from a licensed legal professional.

Never disclose details about your specific legal matters outside of situations when you have established solicitor-client relationship with a qualified legal professional. By using this blog, you acknowledge and accept this warning and agree to waive all liability for use of any information contained in this blog.



Refused stay of an N12-based eviction order pending leave to appeal (Pannone v. Peacock, 2022 ONCA 520)

 

An interesting recent decision from the Court of Appeal for Ontario where the court dismissed the tenant's motion to stay an order and refused to exercise its discretion to transfer the matter to the Divisional Court because of prejudice to the landlord.
Context: the landlord's previous real estate deal (which was the basis for the N12 eviction) fell through, and the landlord entered into a new agreement of purchase and sale.
The ruling provides a brief overview of case law on the test on a motion for a stay pending appeal or leave to appeal.
"... [7] On a motion brought by the landlord, a single judge of the Divisional Court quashed the tenants' appeal and ordered them to vacate by June 28, 2022, failing which the eviction could proceed. Evidence filed by the landlord immediately prior to the motion to quash (the “new evidence”) indicated the landlord's original sale had been terminated as of May 13, 2022 because the tenants had failed to vacate and the purchasers were unable to continue to wait for the premises. The new evidence also indicated the landlord had subsequently resold the property with a closing date of July 20, 2022 at a price $30,000 less than the original sale. The single judge concluded such evidence was irrelevant for the purposes of the motion to quash. In her view, the issues raised on the appeal were either not questions of law or lacking in merit. She also found the appeal was an abuse of process as it was a means of taking advantage of the automatic stay of the Board’s order upon filing a notice of appeal and of avoiding paying rent. Pursuant to the terms of the single judge’s order, the eviction is currently scheduled for July 6, 2022.

[8] The test on a motion for a stay pending appeal or leave to appeal is well‑established:
i. Is there a serious question to be determined on appeal;
ii. Will the moving party suffer irreparable harm if the stay is not granted; and
iii. Does the balance of convenience favour granting a stay?
The components of the test are not water-tight compartments, the strength of one component may compensate for weakness in another. The overarching consideration is whether a stay is in the interests of justice. See: RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, at p. 334; Circuit World Corp. v. Lesperance (1997), 33 O.R. (3d) 674 (C.A.), at p. 677; BTR Global Opportunity Trading Ltd. v. RBC Dexia Investor Services Trust, 2011 ONCA 620, at para. 16.

[9] Although the serious issue to be determined component is a low threshold, I conclude it cannot be met in this case and that a stay should not be granted for that reason alone.

[10] Under s. 21(5) of the CJA, a panel of the Divisional Court may, on motion, set aside or vary the decision of a judge who hears and determines a motion to that court.

[11] This court has consistently held that the proper procedure for setting aside or varying the decision of a single judge of the Divisional Court is by way of a motion to a panel of the Divisional Court under s. 21(5) of the CJA and that parties must proceed by that route before coming to the Court of Appeal: Bernard Property Maintenance, at para. 2; Overseas Missionary Fellowship v. 578369 Ontario Ltd. (1990), 73 O.R. (2d) 73 (C.A.), at p. 75. See also Coote v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission), 2010 ONCA 580, at para. 2; Alliance to Protect Prince Edward County v. wpd White Pines Inc., 2018 ONCA 576, at para. 13.

[12] In the absence of authority to the contrary, my view is that Ms. Rodger's appeal route is by way of review motion to a panel of the Divisional Court under s. 21(5) of the CJA.

[13] Although I cannot as a single judge finally determine whether this court has jurisdiction to entertain Ms. Rodger's leave motion, my view that the proper appeal route is by way of review motion to the Divisional Court militates against granting a stay. If this court has no jurisdiction to entertain the leave motion, the leave motion is without merit and it would be contrary to the interests of justice to grant a stay: see, for example, Fontaine v. Canada (Attorney General), 2018 ONCA 749, at para. 5.

[14] I recognize that in Bernard Property Maintenance, on consent of the parties and with the assent of the Chief Justice of the Superior Court of Justice, this court reconstituted itself as a panel of the Divisional Court to hear and determine an appeal that should have proceeded to the Divisional Court under s. 21(5) of the CJA. However, this court did so only because of the unusual circumstances that this court had granted leave to appeal, a stay of the order below, and an extension of time.

[15] Given that the jurisdictional issue has now been flagged, I see no prospect that leave to appeal would be granted in this case.

[16] Turning to Ms. Rodgers' request that I transfer these matters to the Divisional Court, s. 110 of the CJA provides me with discretion to transfer the proceedings rather than requiring Ms. Rodgers to recommence proceedings in the Divisional Court if so advised. Relevant considerations concerning the exercise of such discretion include:
· the merits of the proposed appeal or application; and
· whether the respondent will suffer undue prejudice as a result of further delay waiting for the matter to be heard: Bernard v. Fuhgeh, 2020 ONCA 529, at para. 15.

[17] The landlord opposes the transfer request contending that there is no merit in the proposed panel review and that he will suffer prejudice due to several factors, including the following:
· the tenants continuing failure to pay rent (the single judge determined rental arrears amounted to $9,200 as of June 16, 2022);
· the fact that his original real estate transaction was terminated because of the tenants' persistent refusal to vacate despite the eviction order; and
· further delay may jeopardize the new sale scheduled to close on July 20, 2022.

[18] While I agree that many of the issues Ms. Rodgers raises on her leave application have no merit, in my view, she has raised a question of law in her stay motion concerning the new evidence that has at least some arguable merit.

[19] In particular, Ms. Rodgers submits that because the landlord's original notice of termination under s. 49 of the RTA was given on behalf of the purchasers under the landlord's original agreement of purchase and sale that was subsequently terminated, the eviction order that was made in reliance on that notice of termination should be set aside or treated as having no force and effect. She submits that on a plain reading of s. 49, the notice of termination is given on behalf of the purchaser and cannot be used by the landlord to "bridge" to a new purchaser.

[20] Ms. Rodgers relies on Gill v. Laframboise, Board file CEL-00894-21, in support of her position. However, in that case, the landlord was applying for an eviction order based on a notice of termination served on behalf of a purchaser under an agreement of purchase and sale that had been terminated and had not served a termination notice on behalf of the purchaser under a new agreement for sale the landlord had made. The Board declined to make the eviction order sought based on the original notice of termination. In this case, the landlord obtained an eviction order but was unable to complete his original transaction because of the tenants' failure to vacate. The landlord argues that the RTA should not be interpreted in such a way as to allow tenants to frustrate landlords' ability to sell their property. The eviction order once obtained should not be set aside where the landlord was unable to complete a sale transaction due to the actions of the tenant.

[21] Counsel for the Landlord and Tenant Board who attended this proceeding was not aware of any other authority addressing the issue.

[22] Although I agree that the question of law Ms. Rodgers has raised has at least some arguable merit, I decline to exercise my discretion to transfer her motions.

[23] In my view, there is also merit in the landlord's argument. Moreover, the landlord has already suffered considerable prejudice through the actions of the tenants in that he lost the benefit of his original sale agreement through their failure to comply with the original eviction order and the tenants have continued to occupy the premises without paying rent. When asked, Ms. Rodgers did not offer any terms that would minimize the prejudice the landlord is continuing to suffer by her continued occupation of the premises. There is no evidence before me concerning whether the tenants have secured other premises. Taking account of all the circumstances, I conclude that it should be for Ms. Rodgers to take whatever steps she deems advisable to bring proceedings in the proper forum to either attempt to halt the eviction or pursue other remedies that she may have.
..."













Disclaimer:

You should not act or rely on any information provided in this blog. It is not legal advice, and the content is provided for general discussion and general information purposes only and to help encourage further research. To ensure your interests are protected, retain or formally seek legal advice from a licensed legal professional.

Never disclose details about your specific legal matters outside of situations when you have established solicitor-client relationship with a qualified legal professional. By using this blog, you acknowledge and accept this warning and agree to waive all liability for use of any information contained in this blog.





Inflation, Speculation on the Guideline for 2024 and the Future of 2.5% Cap (RTA ss.120(2)2) - June 27, 2023 Update

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